Item6EnforcementNoticeAppealDecision

Agenda Item 6

CAIRNGORMS NATION­AL PARK AUTHOR­ITY Plan­ning Com­mit­tee Agenda Item 6 08/11/2024

DPEA ref EΝΑ-001‑2005 CNPA ref 2023/0018/ENF

Enforce­ment notice appeal Decision

Tulquhonie Carr Bridge High­land PH23 3NA

Plan­ning and Envir­on­ment­al Appeals Divi­sion Had­ri­an House, Cal­l­en­dar Busi­ness Park, Falkirk, FK1 1XR E: [email protected] T: 0300 244 6668

Town and Coun­try Plan­ning (Scot­land) Act 1997 Appeal Decision Notice

Scot­tish Gov­ern­ment Riaghaltas na h‑Alba gov.scot

Decision by Allis­on Coard, a Report­er appoin­ted by the Scot­tish Min­is­ters • Enforce­ment notice appeal ref­er­ence: ENA-001‑2005 • Site address: Tulquhonie, Car­rbridge, High­land, PH23 3NA • Appeal by Cairngorms Wood­land Ltd against the enforce­ment notice dated 30 April 2024 served by Cairngorms Nation­al Park Author­ity • The alleged breach of plan­ning con­trol use of land for the place­ment of two stor­age con­tain­ers (being described as a ​‘cara­van’), sol­ar pan­els, water tanks, toi­lets, tents, and oth­er ancil­lary equip­ment brought onto the Land (“the Devel­op­ment”), • Date of site vis­it by Report­er: 26 July 2024

Date of appeal decision: 21 Octo­ber 2024

Decision

I dis­miss the appeal and dir­ect that the enforce­ment notice dated 30 April 2024 be upheld sub­ject to the vari­ation of the terms of the notice as set out in Annex A below.

Sub­ject to any applic­a­tion to the Court of Ses­sion, the enforce­ment notice takes effect on the date of this decision, which con­sti­tutes the determ­in­a­tion of the appeal for the pur­pose of Sec­tion 131(3) of the Act.

Reas­on­ing

1. The appeal against the enforce­ment notice was made on the fol­low­ing grounds as provided for by sec­tion 130(1) of the Act:

(b) that the mat­ters which, by vir­tue of sec­tion 128(1)(a) have been stated in the notice, have not occurred; © that those mat­ters (if they occurred) do not con­sti­tute a breach of plan­ning con­trol; and (e) that cop­ies of the enforce­ment notice were not served as required by sec­tion 127

Appeal on Ground b)

1. The plan­ning author­ity sub­mits pho­to­graphs show­ing the con­tain­er struc­ture and oth­er equip­ment dated 4 March 2024 and 2 April 2024. The notice refers spe­cific­ally to two stor­age con­tain­ers, water tanks, toi­lets, tents and oth­er ancil­lary equip­ment. My site vis­it con­firmed the con­tain­er struc­ture, a ten­ted struc­ture and water tanks. Oth­er works have clearly occurred since the enforce­ment notice was issued, includ­ing install­a­tion of oth­er struc­tures, a wind tur­bine and deck­ing around the con­tain­er unit. I am con­scious my con­sid­er­a­tion here is focussed on the ele­ments of use lis­ted in the notice. Nevertheless,

ΕΝΑ-001‑2005 2 even the extent of works as included in the notice serve to give the single unit, which is the main sub­ject of this appeal, an appear­ance of per­man­ence. The con­tain­er struc­ture (described by the appel­lant as a cara­van) is sited on an area of cleared ground with­in a con­i­fer­ous forest. It is clad in met­al sheet­ing with win­dow open­ings but is placed on level ground. It is not on wheels and has been con­ver­ted intern­ally to provide liv­ing space. I also noted pipe­work lead­ing to the water tanks. From the pho­to­graphs and as con­firmed through my site vis­it it is clear that the mat­ters as stated in the notice have occurred.

1. The appeal is made on grounds includ­ing b) but the appel­lant does not explain why it is con­sidered that the mat­ters have not occurred. Instead, an issue is raised as to the extent of the land sub­ject to the notice. I accept the area shown on the notice extends to the wider land­hold­ing. That wider area, out­with the clear­ing described above, has an access track but is oth­er­wise occu­pied by a con­i­fer­ous wood­land. The import­ant issue is that it remains clear that the notice includes the land on which the mat­ters have occurred. I find that to be the case. The appeal on ground b) fails.

Appeal on ground c): Defin­i­tion of a caravan

1. The sub­mis­sions in this case require me to determ­ine wheth­er the works con­sti­tute per­mit­ted devel­op­ment such that they are exempt from enforcement.

2. Class 16 of The Town and Coun­try Plan­ning (Gen­er­al Per­mit­ted Devel­op­ment) (Scot­land) Order 1992 (GDPO) con­fers per­mit­ted devel­op­ment rights for the use of land as a cara­van site in cer­tain cir­cum­stances. In sum­mary these include where incid­ent­al to the use of a dwell­ing, on land­hold­ings of a cer­tain size for less than 28 days, in asso­ci­ation with build­ing and engin­eer­ing sites or for sea­son­al use for people employed in agri­cul­tur­al or forestry. In addi­tion, there is pro­vi­sion for sites for cara­van use for the pur­poses of recre­ation where super­vised by an exemp­ted organ­isa­tion. I return to these pro­vi­sions below.

3. I accept the plan­ning authority’s view that these pro­vi­sions can only be enjoyed in the event that the use of the land involves a struc­ture that can leg­ally be defined as a caravan.

4. The Cara­van Act 1960 set out that a ​“cara­van site” is: ​“land on which a cara­van is sta­tioned for the pur­pose of human hab­it­a­tion and land which is used in con­junc­tion with land on which a cara­van is so sta­tioned”. Sec­tion 29 of the Cara­van Act ref­er­ences a cara­van as any struc­ture designed or adap­ted for human hab­it­a­tion which is cap­able of being moved from one place to anoth­er by means of tow­ing or trans­port­ing by motor vehicle.

5. Fur­ther cla­ri­fic­a­tion is provided by Sec­tion 13(1) of the Cara­van Act 1968 in rela­tion to twin unit cara­vans. This ref­er­ences a struc­ture designed or adap­ted for human hab­it­a­tion which is com­posed of not more than two sec­tions sep­ar­ately con­struc­ted and designed to be assembled on a site by means of bolts, clamps or oth­er devices; and is, when assembled, phys­ic­ally cap­able of being moved by road from one place to anoth­er (wheth­er by being towed, or by being trans­por­ted on a motor vehicle or trail­er)”. It fur­ther cla­ri­fies that the struc­ture can still be a cara­van even if it is not leg­ally cap­able of being moved by road. It also spe­cifies max­im­um dimen­sions. How­ever, giv­en the struc­ture falls with­in those dimen­sions I find no con­tra­ven­tion in that spe­cif­ic respect.

6. The plan­ning author­ity refers me to doc­u­ment CNPA9 which is an Eng­lish Court of Appeal decision on the case of Carter and Anoth­er v Sec­ret­ary of State for the Envir­on­ment 1994. This con­sidered wheth­er a struc­ture con­sti­tuted a cara­van for the pur­poses of section

ΕΝΑ-001‑2005 3 29 of the Cara­van Act. It con­cludes that whilst each case should be con­sidered on its mer­its a dis­tinc­tion can be made between struc­tures cap­able of being moved as a single unit rather than in com­pon­ent parts. Weight is to be attached to the descrip­tion of the struc­ture as a whole. I note the ref­er­enced court case involved a unit made up of 4 sec­tions rather than the 2 con­tain­ers that apply in this case.

1. I con­sider that the ship­ping con­tain­ers on which the struc­ture is based would have been trans­por­ted ini­tially by road. The site is in a forest and only access­ible by a rough track lined by trees. The appellant’s sub­mit­ted pho­to­graphs show one half of the struc­ture being moved on detach­able wheels, by tract­or, to the site. The sec­tion being towed has win­dow open­ings and clad­ding so clearly recog­nis­able as one half of the unit I observed on my site vis­it. I agree with the plan­ning author­ity that the nature of the forest access track and the trees either side would pre­vent the struc­ture being moved back to a pub­lic or metalled road without split­ting it again into its two com­pon­ent parts. I am not con­sid­er­ing the plan­ning mer­its of this pro­pos­al so my remit does not extend to con­sid­er­a­tion of the suit­ab­il­ity of the site and its access.

2. How­ever, on my read­ing, the struc­ture in its assembled form need only be phys­ic­ally cap­able of being moved from one place to anoth­er by road. The appellant’s evid­ence indic­ates that trans­port as a single unit is unlikely to be eco­nom­ic­al. Nev­er­the­less, a let­ter from a former Roy­al Engin­eer sup­ports the appellant’s case that it would remain pos­sible to trans­port the struc­ture, in one piece, when towed on wheels or loaded onto a heavy goods vehicle. There is noth­ing to sug­gest the struc­ture bene­fits from a sub frame that would per­haps more con­clus­ively demon­strate the struc­tur­al integ­rity of the unit and its mobil­ity. On the oth­er hand, I find noth­ing con­clus­ive to sug­gest the two con­tain­ers would need such a struc­ture if fixed togeth­er by oth­er means. In this case the struc­ture is indic­ated to be rein­forced by tim­ber and steel with mech­an­ic­al fix­ings to join the two halves.

3. I find insuf­fi­cient evid­ence to con­clude the single struc­ture could not be defined as mobile. I under­stand the plan­ning authority’s con­cern about applic­a­tion of a hypo­thet­ic­al scen­ario and acknow­ledge the obvi­ous restric­tion on the move­ment of the unit as a whole with­in its cur­rent forest loc­al­ity. Nev­er­the­less, I find these con­sid­er­a­tions do not rule out a con­clu­sion that the unit as a whole is phys­ic­ally cap­able of being transportable.

4. Con­sequently, I do not find the council’s reli­ance on the sub­mit­ted court case con­clus­ive in the par­tic­u­lar cir­cum­stances of this case. The court decision indic­ates that each case must be con­sidered on its mer­its. The decision re-enforces the word­ing of the Act in rela­tion to the need for the struc­ture to be cap­able of being moved as a single unit. The ref­er­enced case was in rela­tion to a struc­ture in four sec­tions and it is not clear to me the cir­cum­stances are entirely similar.

5. In con­clu­sion I con­sider that the struc­ture can be con­sidered in the con­text of the rel­ev­ant pro­vi­sions for the use of the land as a cara­van site.

Appeal on Ground c) : Exemp­tion Certificate

1. Hav­ing con­cluded, on the bal­ance of evid­ence, that the struc­ture can be con­sidered as a cara­van I must determ­ine wheth­er per­mit­ted devel­op­ment rights can apply in the con­text of the sub­mit­ted ​“exemp­tion certificate”.

2. The sub­mit­ted copy is headed ​“Moon­rise camp and cara­van club”. It states that it was presen­ted to Cairngorm Wood­land for recre­ation­al cara­van use of land at Tolquo­honie Wood and sub­ject to the mem­ber­ship code of con­duct. It includes text stat­ing that it is valid

ΕΝΑ-001‑2005 4 from 5 Novem­ber 2023 to 4 Novem­ber 2024. The Moon­rise camp and cara­van club is stated to be an organ­isa­tion exemp­ted under Sched­ule 1 part 4 and 5 of the 1960 Act.

1. Sec­tion 5(1) of the first sched­ule to the Cara­van Act states that a site licence shall not be required for the use as a cara­van site of land where there is a cer­ti­fic­ate issued by an exemp­ted organ­isa­tion; where there are not more than five cara­vans sta­tioned for the pur­poses of human hab­it­a­tion on the land to which the cer­ti­fic­ate relates. Sec­tion 5 (2) goes onto state that for the pur­poses of this para­graph an exemp­ted organ­isa­tion may issue a cer­ti­fic­ate stat­ing that the land has been approved by the exemp­ted organ­isa­tion for use by its mem­bers for the pur­poses of recre­ation for a peri­od not exceed­ing one year.

2. I note the plan­ning authority’s ques­tions around the status of this exemp­tion includ­ing the alleged involve­ment of the appel­lant with the exemp­ted organ­isa­tion. The onus of evid­ence in this appeal lies with the appel­lant. How­ever, I under­stand that the appel­lant may have assumed that the plan­ning author­ity and I would be famil­i­ar with the pro­cess of exemp­tion, its applic­a­tion in Scot­land and any terms that apply. To cla­ri­fy these mat­ters I sought fur­ther writ­ten sub­mis­sions so that my decision could be prop­erly informed as to the status and role of an exemp­ted organisation.

3. The fur­ther sub­mis­sions received include the exemp­ted organ­isa­tion cer­ti­fic­ate, the code of con­duct and cla­ri­fic­a­tion that the grant­ing of exemp­tions is a devolved func­tion of the Scot­tish Gov­ern­ment. The appel­lant accepts being a found­ing mem­ber of Moon­rise and being involved in its due dili­gence pro­cess. How­ever, I con­sider my remit extends only to determ­in­ing wheth­er a val­id exemp­tion cer­ti­fic­ate is in place for the land sub­ject to the enforce­ment notice. I con­sider that to be the case and that it would be bey­ond the scope of this appeal to inter­rog­ate the status of the approved grant­ing organisation.

4. I note that the code of con­duct states that hosts must only use land and cara­van types that have been approved by Moon­rise and that exemp­tion cer­ti­fic­ates can be reviewed and repealed by Moon­rise at any time. Whilst exemp­tion cer­ti­fic­ates are issued for a max­im­um of 1 year, a renew­al applic­a­tion can be lodged 2 months pri­or to the expiry date, or exemp­ted site status will auto­mat­ic­ally lapse. There is noth­ing in the sub­mis­sions to indic­ate that a renew­al applic­a­tion has not been lodged and noth­ing that would appear to pre­vent such a renew­al. A mater­i­al breach or repeated breach of the code of con­duct may res­ult in sus­pen­sion or ter­min­a­tion of an Exemp­tion Cer­ti­fic­ate. How­ever, those are mat­ters at the dis­cre­tion of Moon­rise rather than the plan­ning system.

5. I agree with the plan­ning author­ity that any val­id exemp­tion can only apply to a site licence. How­ever, I accept in turn there is pro­vi­sion for that to trans­late to an exemp­tion from the need to apply for plan­ning per­mis­sion. Non­ethe­less I must also con­sider the extent to which that assump­tion extends to any oth­er rel­ev­ant pro­vi­sions of the Plan­ning Act and any con­di­tions and exemp­tions that apply in exer­cising the per­mit­ted devel­op­ment rights that are applied to exemp­ted organ­isa­tions. I return to that mat­ter below.

6. The appel­lant ref­er­ences the High­land Council’s determ­in­a­tion that the site can be law­fully used for cara­vans being con­firmed by the grant of a short term let licence. How­ever, I am con­scious this is a sep­ar­ate legis­lat­ive pro­cess and not one of dir­ect rel­ev­ance to the enforce­ment notice in this case.

7. There is also ref­er­ence to forestry use. In that spe­cif­ic respect the licence and oth­er ref­er­ences to leis­ure and tour­ism serve to con­firm to me that the cara­van is not inten­ded for the pur­poses of forestry, but rather as short term let accom­mod­a­tion. Whilst I accept that forestry can con­fer some per­mit­ted devel­op­ment rights to the sit­ing of cara­vans the focus of

ΕΝΑ-001‑2005 5 the appellant’s evid­ence is on leis­ure use, an exemp­tion cer­ti­fic­ate for leis­ure use and a short term let licence. None of that sug­gests to me the use of the cara­van solely for the pur­poses of Forestry. In any event it is not clear that there are cur­rent ongo­ing forestry oper­a­tions oth­er than the clear­ing of the site for the use of the land sub­ject of this enforce­ment notice.

1. Tak­ing all of the above togeth­er I accept that in prin­ciple the sub­mit­ted exemp­tion cer­ti­fic­ate may provide grounds to quash the notice giv­en the stated exemp­tion applies until Novem­ber 2024. That in prin­ciple con­clu­sion is how­ever sub­ject to my fur­ther detailed con­sid­er­a­tion below.

Appeal on ground c) : oth­er reg­u­lat­ory controls

1. Para­graph 23 of Scot­tish Gov­ern­ment Cir­cu­lar 1 – 2017 explains the applic­a­tion of the Envir­on­ment­al Impact Assess­ment (EIA) Reg­u­la­tions. Para­graph 68 explains that Sched­ule 2 devel­op­ment does not con­sti­tute per­mit­ted devel­op­ment unless the plan­ning author­ity has adop­ted a screen­ing opin­ion to the effect that EIA is not required. Per­man­ent cara­van sites with­in a Nation­al Park fall with­in Sched­ule 2. There is an estab­lished pro­cess whereby a screen­ing opin­ion can be reques­ted from the plan­ning author­ity. Altern­at­ively, a screen­ing dir­ec­tion can be reques­ted from Scot­tish Min­is­ters. Unlike in the cir­cum­stances of a plan­ning appeal I am unable to address the issue by car­ry­ing out my own screen­ing giv­en my remit here is only to decide wheth­er a breach of plan­ning con­trol has occurred.

2. The appel­lant relies on the stated exemp­tion cer­ti­fic­ate being for a tem­por­ary peri­od until Novem­ber 2024. How­ever, the evid­ence for that assump­tion is based purely on the terms of that cer­ti­fic­ate. My obser­va­tions on site, as to the extent of works car­ried out, would not sug­gest to me the inten­tion is to cease the use in Novem­ber. It is unclear how long the stated exemp­tion could apply but it is cap­able of being rolled for­ward and so estab­lish­ing this use in the longer term. If the inten­tion is to remove the cara­van site on expiry of the cer­ti­fic­ate, then the terms of the enforce­ment notice would be met.

3. Giv­en my con­clu­sion on per­man­ence I con­sider that a pre­cau­tion­ary approach reflect­ing the object­ives and intent of the reg­u­la­tions would apply. Con­sequently, pri­or screen­ing was required in this case. I do not con­sider I have per­suas­ive evid­ence that the mat­ters stated in the notice are per­mit­ted devel­op­ment as I am not in receipt of a pri­or screen­ing opin­ion or dir­ec­tion. Quash­ing this enforce­ment notice would by con­sequence accept that the mat­ters are per­mit­ted devel­op­ment. That premise could apply so long as the exemp­tion was suc­cess­fully renewed. As a res­ult, such a decision could enable per­man­ent estab­lish­ment of the use. In con­clu­sion, I find that an EIA screen­ing would have been neces­sary before it could be estab­lished that the per­mit­ted devel­op­ment rights, oth­er­wise con­ferred by the exemp­tion cer­ti­fic­ate, could be applied.

4. In addi­tion, Para­graph 3(1) of GPDO makes all classes of per­mit­ted devel­op­ment sub­ject to cer­tain pro­vi­sions of the Con­ser­va­tion (Nat­ur­al Hab­it­ats, & c.) Reg­u­la­tions 1994 (the ​“Hab­it­ats Reg­u­la­tions”). The plan­ning author­ity con­firm that the wood­land is not with­in a Spe­cial Pro­tec­tion Area but alerts me to the pres­ence of caper­cail­lie with­in the wood­land which includes the appeal site. I am aware that the pro­tec­tion of the qual­i­fy­ing interests of a Spe­cial Pro­tec­tion Area extend bey­ond the site and that in this case a num­ber of object­ives apply. These include avoid­ance of deteri­or­a­tion of the hab­it­ats of the qual­i­fy­ing spe­cies and any sig­ni­fic­ant dis­turb­ance to ensure the integ­rity of the site is main­tained. The plan­ning author­ity states that hav­ing com­menced devel­op­ment without hav­ing sought and obtained approv­al under Reg­u­la­tion 62, the appel­lant is in breach of reg­u­la­tion 60(1) of the

ΕΝΑ-001‑2005 6 Hab­it­ats Reg­u­la­tions. It explains that overnight stays and human activ­ity in this wood­land would have a poten­tial adverse effect on the integ­rity of five Spe­cial Pro­tec­tion Areas.

1. Reg­u­la­tion 61 states that where it is inten­ded to rely on per­mit­ted devel­op­ment rights applic­a­tions may be made in writ­ing to the appro­pri­ate nature con­ser­va­tion body. This could enable con­firm­a­tion or oth­er­wise as to wheth­er the pro­pos­al is likely to have a sig­ni­fic­ant effect. In that cir­cum­stance an opin­ion from NatureScot could have been con­sidered con­clus­ive. How­ever, in this case I have no such opinion.

2. The Nation­al Park Author­ity indic­ates that there could be a poten­tially sig­ni­fic­ant effect on the qual­i­fy­ing interests of the Spe­cial Pro­tec­tion Area. Doc­u­ment CNPA 12 advises that both the his­tor­ic­al records and recent sur­veys indic­ate the pres­ence of caper­cail­lie in Tolquhonie Wood. In turn the appel­lant ques­tions the pres­ence of caper­cail­lie but presents no con­clus­ive evid­ence in that respect oth­er than ques­tion­ing the descrip­tion of his land and the nature of the sur­round­ing habitat.

3. A doc­u­ment is sub­mit­ted indic­at­ing the land under the name Dal­buaick Plant­a­tion, Bad­den­gorm Wood. The ground is described as closed can­opy forest that does not provide hab­it­at for ground nest­ing birds. How­ever, the coun­cil con­firm that the land sub­ject to the enforce­ment notice is the land on which it raises the issue of Caper­cailie. This applies irre­spect­ive of any dif­fer­ent name that may be applied. The poten­tial of a sig­ni­fic­ant effect is enough to trig­ger the need for screen­ing. In the absence of a response from NatureScot, to con­firm that there is no poten­tially sig­ni­fic­ant effect, I find a breach of plan­ning con­trol is fur­ther con­firmed in this respect.

4. The appel­lant refers to biod­iversity pro­mo­tion as a require­ment of the exemp­tion cer­ti­fic­ate as well as an oppor­tun­ity to work con­struct­ively on this with the park author­ity. How­ever, I do not con­sider this a rel­ev­ant mat­ter as I am not con­sid­er­ing the plan­ning mer­its of a pro­pos­al but rather the grounds for enforcement.

5. I am con­scious that the spe­cif­ic mat­ter of the hab­it­ats reg­u­la­tions was intro­duced at appeal and is not ref­er­enced in the breach of plan­ning con­trol. Nev­er­the­less, I must determ­ine wheth­er a breach in plan­ning con­trol has occurred. It was the appellant’s respons­ib­il­ity to have sought con­firm­a­tion as to any such require­ments that applied pri­or to com­men­cing with the change of use of the land. Per­mit­ted devel­op­ment rights, includ­ing those con­ferred by exemp­tion cer­ti­fic­ates, can only be exer­cised in cer­tain cir­cum­stances. I find those cir­cum­stances have not been demon­strated, by the appel­lant, in this case.

Con­clu­sion on ground c)

1. For the reas­ons stated above I con­sider that irre­spect­ive of the oth­er mat­ters rehearsed there has been a clear breach of plan­ning con­trol. It is not demon­strated that the lim­it­a­tions that restrict the applic­a­tion of per­mit­ted devel­op­ment rights in this case have been met. In an enforce­ment case the onus of proof lies with the appel­lant. On the bal­ance of evid­ence, I con­clude that the pro­pos­al was sub­ject to EIA screen­ing. Whilst not ref­er­enced in the enforce­ment notice I am also unable to con­clude that per­mit­ted devel­op­ment is con­firmed giv­en the applic­a­tion of the Hab­it­ats Regulations.

2. I do not con­sider that omis­sion from the cer­ti­fic­ate, of the hab­it­ats issue, jus­ti­fies quash­ing the notice. Whilst I have not agreed fully with the plan­ning authority’s reas­ons this does not lead me to the con­clu­sion there has been no breach of plan­ning con­trol. In that respect the sub­stance of the notice in identi­fy­ing a breach of plan­ning con­trol and the steps

ΕΝΑ-001‑2005 7 to address that breach remain val­id and sup­port­able. I have scope to amend the notice so long as this does not cause injustice to the appellant.

1. The mat­ter of screen­ing was raised in the con­text of the Envir­on­ment­al Impact Assess­ment Reg­u­la­tions. The notice sig­nals the main issue being that the mat­ters are not con­firmed as per­mit­ted devel­op­ment. Con­sequently, I con­sider the notice would be cap­able of stand­ing as served. Nev­er­the­less, for the reas­ons stated above I find the text on the defin­i­tion of a cara­van should be removed and replaced with a fac­tu­al state­ment as to the sub­mit­ted exemp­tion cer­ti­fic­ate. This reflects the case presen­ted by the appel­lant but only in part. Not­with­stand­ing my own con­clu­sion above on the applic­able terms of the Hab­it­ats Reg­u­la­tions, I find the plan­ning authority’s reas­on based on the applic­a­tion of the ElΑ reg­u­la­tions still stands and is cap­able alone of sup­port­ing the notice. Con­sequently, the appeal fails on Ground c).

Appeal on ground e)

1. Turn­ing to the final ground I note ground e) is not ticked on the appeal form but is oth­er­wise ref­er­enced. How­ever, there is no cor­res­pond­ing detail. The Plan­ning Author­ity provides evid­ence of ser­vice (CNPA 5 and 6). I find no evid­ence to the contrary.

Oth­er Matters

1. The appel­lant raises oth­er mat­ters of impar­ti­al­ity, fair­ness and mis­con­duct but these are not mat­ters for this enforce­ment appeal. My con­sid­er­a­tion is lim­ited to the stated grounds.

Over­all Conclusion

1. As the appeal fails under the stated grounds, I dis­miss the appeal and uphold the enforce­ment notice sub­ject to the stated vari­ations as set out in Annex A.

Allis­on Coard Reporter

Annex A

In Sec­tion 3 ​“The Breach of Plan­ning Con­trol Alleged” delete para­graph 3 and the first sen­tence of para­graph 4.

Replace the first sen­tence of para­graph 4 as follows:

There is a cara­van exemp­tion cer­ti­fic­ate issued by Moon­rise Camp and Cara­van Club for the peri­od up to 4 Novem­ber 2024.

Add ​“How­ever” at the start of the fol­low­ing sen­tence so it reads as follows:

How­ever, this Devel­op­ment is ​‘Sched­ule 2’ devel­op­ment as described in Sched­ule 2, para 2, des­ig­na­tion 12(e) of the Town and Coun­try Plan­ning (Envir­on­ment­al Impact Assess­ment) (Scot­land) Reg­u­la­tions 2017 and has been car­ried out in a sens­it­ive area (an area des­ig­nated as a Nation­al Park by a des­ig­na­tion order made by the Scot­tish Min­is­ters under sec­tion 6(1) (mak­ing of des­ig­na­tion orders) of the Nation­al Parks (Scot­land) Act 2000).

Retain all remain­ing paragraphs.